A widely read AI commentator says today's AI is nowhere near its ceiling.
You read a lot of AI takes to calibrate your own bets in Work OS and on the blog, and this one is worth slowing down for. An AI watcher going by @bayeslord posted a list of 46 predictions on X on 2026-06-30, cleaned up from an earlier thread. The core claim: almost everyone, including markets, governments, and the AI labs themselves, is judging AI's future by how the recent past looked, and that is a mistake. His bet is that the methods behind AI, not just bigger machines, still have a lot of room to improve: maybe as many as ten more ten-times jumps in how much intelligence you get for the same cost, though four to seven is more likely. If he is right, progress will not look like a straight line. It will look like a jump nobody priced in.
He describes today as early takeoff: AI is starting to improve AI, which he calls one of the most consequential steps in history. The scarce resource used to be chips and the time it takes to run them. Now it is cheaper to send an AI agent, a system that takes several steps on its own, chasing a research idea and see what it brings back, because that costs tokens, chunks of text roughly three quarters of a word each, instead of a researcher's limited hours. He says math and coding problems are already falling to bigger training runs, teaching a model on a huge pile of data, combined with reinforcement learning, a training method that rewards the model for getting the right answer, and that everything else is next.
On why long, multi-step tasks are getting easier for AI agents, he pushes back on a common worry, associated with researcher Yann LeCun, that errors compound the longer a task runs, so a model would need equally long training to handle it. His counter is that models are instead getting better at catching and fixing their own mistakes mid-task, what he calls error correction, and that this is why a widely watched measure of how long a task AI agents can complete unsupervised has been climbing fast: agents, he says, are starting to hit error correction escape velocity. He expects a Move 37 moment, the term for a shockingly good move, borrowed from AlphaGo's famous game against a human champion, in every serious technical field, and expects those moments to stop feeling special within a few years.
On hardware, he does not think today's AI chips are close to their physical limit, and flags photonics, computing with light instead of electricity, and stochastic silicon, chips built to embrace randomness, as candidates for the next jump, while admitting he expects the actual winner to be a surprise. On competition between AI labs, his view is conditional. If the underlying science of how these models learn stays as shallow as it looks today, secrets are cheap to copy and any lab's edge fades fast, because training a small model to copy a big one, plus more data and time, eventually catches up to raw chip scale. If the science gets deeper as labs scale up, each new increment buys an edge that is harder for anyone else to close. Nobody, in his telling, actually knows which of those two worlds we are in.
His last point worth carrying: the intelligence supply chain, meaning who actually makes AI progress happen, is currently centered on a handful of labs, because they employ the researchers who find the good ideas. He thinks that changes once labs finish automating the researchers themselves. If publicly available models, ones anyone can download and run, do not fall too far behind, and the top labs do not lock down their own researcher-replacement models, the labs' remaining edge stops being about smarter methods and starts being about who has more capital, more chips, and better data.